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Abstract  
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the oldest 
dedicated development institution in the multilateral system, yet remains 
one of the smallest in terms of funding and resources. This belies its 
central role in contributing to rankings, benchmarks and ratings which 
have defined the process of development for states, non-government 
organisations and the private sector. The UNDP created the Human 
Development Index (HDI), coordinates the benchmarks of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and recently devised sovereign 
credit ratings in partnership with Standard and Poor’s. In this regard 
mobilising numbers in support of development strategies is not new, yet 
it will be argued that the UNDPs development policy has seen a 
significant shift from the qualitative analysis of the HDI to the 
quantitative nature of credit rating. This paper will adopt a 
governmentality approach in looking at sovereign credit rating and the 
way in which the power of numbers informs the rationality 
underpinning the partnership between the UNDP and the rating agency 
Standard and Poor’s. It concludes that while pursuing sovereign credit 
rating may be seen as ‘capacity development’ for the UNDP, it in fact 
represents a shift by the organisation toward quantitative practices that 
have particular consequences for the global governance of development.  
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Introduction 
 
The UNDP is an international organisation (IO) that relies on voluntary 
contributions and the delegated authority of member states to increase the 
social, technical, economic and governance capacity of developing countries. 
Its partnership with a credit rating agency (CRA), privately owned and 
contracted to conduct surveillance and compile information assessing risk for 
investment and profit, presents an interesting case in the changing nature of 
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modern development in contemporary global economic governance. One that 
emphasises the complicated nature of authority and shifting boundaries 
between public and private spheres of interest for states and organisations. 
Coming from a distinctly liberal mould, the extent and nature of the UNDPs 
‘capacity development’ in economic and financial expertise has traditionally 
involved contracting expert advice aimed at empowering governments on 
specific issues. This is in contrast to the interventionist one-size-fits-all or 
‘neo-liberal’ conditionality associated with the economic planning of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions. Nonetheless the UNDPs development policy has 
become framed by more normative market approaches to economic 
governance and development initiated by the UN Secretariat involving 
private actors, such as the Global Compact and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and Financing for Development in the pursuit of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).  
 
The paper will specifically address the credit rating initiative as a partnership 
based on the core UNDP understanding of capacity development. It will be 
argued that while the rating initiative seeks to increase states’ capacity by 
encouraging access to capital markets, it in fact represents a transformation of 
governance based on the traditional notion of capacity development as 
neutral expertise. This is a result of internal and external pressures on the 
UNDP that have shifted it toward quantitative approaches to development 
which diverge from the organisations’ traditional non-interventionist and 
qualitative understanding of development. The relationship between IOs, 
states and CRAs, also generates new forms of partnership and practices 
which shift the relationships between the UNDP and States in unintended 
ways that can constrain capacity rather than enhance it. In order to 
understand these relationships and practices an analysis based on an 
understanding of Foucault’s concept of governmentality will be adopted. In 
this understanding it is not so much the power of the state through unitary 
government which is focused on but the fact that state capacity is now subject 
to multiple governmental techniques and practices such as credit rating. More 
precisely ‘governmentality…is at once internal and external to the 
state…[and] the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the 
competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private…thus 
the state can only be understood…on the basis of the general tactics of 
governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991:103). It will be shown through 
governmentality that it is the power of credit rating as a private and external 
‘technology of government’ which actively enrols and shapes the 
representations of all actors involved, including states and IOs, and promises 
to enhance capacity but simultaneously engages a wider arrangement of 
governance at a distance by market actors. It is not being suggested that the 
UNDP coercively enrolled states into the rating process as part of a higher 
ideology or understanding of what states ‘should’ do according to a fixed 
agenda. Rather, the power of credit rating alters understanding global 
governance in development in relation to the delegated authority of states to 
3 
 
IOs (Koremenos et al., 2001; Hawkins et al., 2006) as well as further 
problematising the role of ideas and bureaucrats agency (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004; Brunsson, 2002; St Clair, 2004) within the UNDP, as an 
atypical IO due to the historical nature of its structure, mandate and 
resources.  
 
The article will first address the organisation of the UNDP looking at both the 
external and internal changes that prompted the credit rating initiative and 
how it ultimately conflicts with ‘capacity development’. From the external 
perspective  there can be seen a momentum beginning in the 1990s with a 
series of high level meetings which increasingly advocated closer engagement 
with private actors and a more quantitative approach to development by the 
UN System. This was in part a response to a crisis in funding as well as a 
rapprochement with the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank) 
after protests over the questionable imposition on developing countries of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the Washington Consensus. 
These external pressures were not isolated from internal changes in the 
UNDP which were sparked by a new Administrator Mark Malloch-Brown in 
1999. In outlining his reform of the organisation as ‘The Way Forward’ 
(UNDP, 2000) he placed the UNDP in charge of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) and ensuring the fulfilment of their ambitious targets. This also 
included the creation of new departments with the UNDP for dealing with 
resources and partnerships and an increasing emphasis on new management 
based on results and outcomes which lead to the credit rating initiative. Yet 
these changes and private tactics did not harmonise the core understanding of 
the UNDPs approach to state capacity development with and the need of 
societies to ‘obtain, strengthen and maintain…capabilities [through] access to 
knowledge, experience and resources’ (UNDP, 2008). It is through credit 
rating and partnership with S&Ps that it will be argued the core UNDP notion 
of capacity development becomes distorted, shifting governance away from 
the states and the organisation.  
 
Secondly, the nature of Standard & Poor’s (S&Ps) and the rating initiative will 
be addressed. This will look at how S&Ps conducts a rating before 
investigating the positive and negative aspects of sovereign rating in 
particular.  For example, while ratings seems to offer access to capital markets 
that is both efficient and emphasises results it does not take into an account 
the ongoing expertise required by governments to negotiate these often 
opaque institutions. Likewise the CRAs attempt to assess political factors but 
also lack the expertise to analyse the particular governance and economic 
structures of the countries they rate which leads to questions regarding the 
involvement of organisations such as the UNDP (Abdelal, 2007:180). This 
creates problems in global governance (Murphy, 2000) that is delegated by 
states to IOs and the relation between the latter and new forms of private 
authority such as CRAs.  
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Finally, the rating process will be analysed through the theoretical perspective 
of governmentality and the nature of the partnership between UNDP and 
S&Ps which adopts rating as a particular technology that governs at distance. 
It is noted that while the rating process in itself is used to promote 
transparency and market interaction on one level, it also contains less obvious 
political characteristics when ratings are used to engage capital markets. The 
increasing use of scientific calculation in public life and a ‘trust in numbers’ 
has led to the increasing belief in the objectivity of various techniques of 
quantification that increase the validity of knowledge and conduct of actors in 
managing typically qualitative understandings of social processes (Porter, 
1995). The aim here is to analyse a particular type of quantification through 
governmentality and open up an understanding of credit ratings used for 
development and the way in which they work through relationships and 
around actors, states or organisations.  
 
The complex processes and relationships involved require an alternate 
understanding of power that can apply to both the process of rating and the 
nature of the partnership between S&Ps and the UNDP. Using this approach 
with S&Ps, the rating process and partnership, can be seen as technologies of 
government hired and mediated by the UNDP. From this it can be seen how 
expertise is enrolled and modes of governance in capacity development have 
shifted from consultation to more subtle managerial interventions based on 
results and performance. IOs such as the UNDP are under a particular liberal 
‘rational-legal’ imperative in development to intervene by setting up projects 
and spending money while also being effective and accountable (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004). In order to do this they often treat countries more or less 
uniformly thus making numbers and ratings important in comparing and 
marking their performance. Yet ratings are not merely objective measures 
created by CRAs, they are powerful devices which allow scrutiny and 
surveillance at a distance and enrol multiple actors into a particular ‘mental 
schemata’ in the governance of finance (Sinclair, 2005:177). This 
understanding of power shows that actors such as the UNDP and S&Ps 
govern in partnership, but that this governing is constituted through rating, 
ranking or benchmarking states and the quantification of specific knowledge. 
Governmentality here questions this schemata and problematises the 
rationality which informs or creates the logic of rating as a technology of 
government linking states, IOs and private CRAs in capacity development. It 
does not provide causal explanations or seek to explain the individual effects 
of credit ratings on economic outcomes for particular states or populations 
involved.   
 
It will be concluded that by tracing the rationality and nature of authority of 
rating as a technology of government we can see a distinct shift toward 
methods of quantification in capacity development employed by the UNDP 
on behalf of states. This is the result of both internal and external pressures on 
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organisations and states to be accountable and produce results in 
development. The pursuit of such objective measures is nonetheless based in 
the qualitative nature and social processes that development seeks to address. 
It is therefore important to analyse the changing nature of authority between 
the spheres of public and private that appear to address development but also 
represent distinct changes in the global governance. 
 
 
UNDP and the Changing Multilateral Environment 
 
Following the end of the Cold War the UNDP faced a sharp decline in its 
untied core voluntary contributions (UNDP, 2007c). In response to the rise in 
bilateral aid and decline in belief of donor states in the accountability of 
untied voluntary contributions, the UNDP and Secretariat launched a series 
of external conferences and initiatives sharply changing traditional UN 
development policy by seeking to incorporate private and market actors in 
development. This led to eventual internal reform and change in the UNDP 
initiated by Administrator Mark Malloch-Brown in 1999 that stretched the 
understanding of capacity development long held by the UNDP  at the fore of 
it development practice. Malloch-Brown, a former World Bank employee and 
the first non-US Administrator, sought to reorient the UNDP by assuming the 
coordination and leadership of the MDGs and instituting results based 
management (RBM) into the governing structure of the UNDP (UNDP, 2000). 
While this met with the approval of some core donor states and fit the 
broader trajectory of private engagement by the UN System, it was also an 
ambitious agenda for such a dispersed organisation. 
 
The UNDP is the largest and oldest multilateral development organisation 
spanning 166 countries at the core of the UN System evolving from the post-
war Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA).  It is a unique 
organisation that does not fit the mould of other IO’s due to the nature of its 
operational role defined variously as ‘technical assistance’, ‘capacity building’ 
or ‘capacity development’. This has traditionally involved a network of 
contracted experts and coordination of the UN Specialised Agencies while 
maintaining the role of the UN Resident Representatives, the political point of 
contact in countries between states and the UN System. Murphy suggests the 
UNDP is best described as, ‘...a ‘network’, a system of ‘partnerships’, and a 
centre of cooperation...not simply a bureaucratic hierarchy of nested roles and 
their related obligations. It is...a decentralized complex of relatively 
autonomous...people and organizations’ (Murphy, 2007:17 -19).  
 
The structure of the UNDP can be roughly divided into four levels of 
authority. The Executive Board comprised of 36 states, including donor and 
recipient countries; the Administrator and management offices; the 5 Regional 
Bureaux; and the Resident Representatives in country.  Complicating these 
levels of authority are the multiple sources of material input and partnerships 
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including principal states, multilateral organisations, NGOs and the private 
sector totalling approximately $5 billion USD per annum. Untied core 
contributions at the discretion of the UNDP total almost a fifth of the budget 
and is almost entirely donated by 15 countries (UNDP, 2005). The bulk of 
funding, over three fifths of the budget, is tied and negotiated by donors 
under the UNDPs thematic areas. The decrease in core untied funding by 
some 35% between 1992 and 1997 (UNDP, 2007c) increased the current 
imbalance with tied resources and in part spurred new initiatives for 
development funding and internal reform. This complex resource allocation 
also reflects the organisation of the UNDP and the multiplicity of authorities 
and relationships that are now part of its external and internal partnerships in 
pursuing capacity development. 
 
While early ideas for incorporating private initiatives into the UNDP’s 
development agenda date back to the late 1980s (Murphy,2007:237-8), the key 
events in the increasing interaction of the UNDP with private actors officially 
began with the 1992 Rio Conference on Sustainability and Development. This 
was followed by the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 
1995 which introduced the idea of credit rating (Kaul and Weitz, 1997), the 
1999 Global Compact, the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development. In April 2002, 
Colin Powell opened a conference at the State Department announcing that 
the US Government was prepared to help African countries obtain sovereign 
credit ratings citing the need to give ‘courage to capital’(Powell, 2002). A 
month later, in May, the Standard & Poor’s/UNDP Credit Rating partnership 
was launched at the annual meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB) 
in Addis Ababa (S&Ps, 2006). This was followed up a year later in 2003 by the 
UNDP hosting the first African Capital Markets Development Forum in 
cooperation with the New York Stock Exchange and African Stock Exchanges 
Association aimed at finding ways to boost foreign investment, encourage 
dialogue between African countries, negotiate grant financing and obtain 
sovereign credit ratings (IMF, 2003; UNDP, 2007). In this context the UNDP 
not only set out a deeper interaction with private actors and under the 
ambitious timetable and platform of the MDGs in benchmarking progress and 
increasing donor confidence, but initiated credit rating as a development 
strategy. In doing so a subtle shift was also made from the distinct advocacy 
and qualitative analysis of development to more pragmatic and quantitative 
approaches in the practice of development. 
 
The use of different rankings and benchmarks has grown considerably in the 
UNDPs development work over the past two decades. The Human 
Development Report initiated in 1990 also contains the Human Development 
Index (HDI) that increasingly built over the last decade the basis for the 
benchmarks set by the MDGs agreed on in 2000. The HDI collects data on 
social aspects of countries such as levels of education, health and welfare that 
are compiled to create rankings of life quality. It grew out of opposition to the 
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dominance of neo-liberal economic rationality epitomised by the structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and neo-classical economic 
models based on growing GDP (Murphy, 2007). The HDI rankings and the 
social indicators it addresses opened up new avenues for reframing how 
development was addressed through broader social concerns for health and 
education that underpin macro economic conditions. The HDI also created a 
powerful standard based on the number of people in the world living on less 
than one dollar a day which contributed to the creation of the benchmarks 
embodied by the MDGs.  
 
Although the intention of both the HDI and MDGs is the improvement of 
living standards for the very poorest of the world’s population, they in fact 
represent a divergence within the UNDP between advocacy based on 
qualitative analysis and practice seeking quantitative measures and results. 
This shift in logic can be seen as a result of pressures in resource mobilisation 
that have moved the emphasis from traditional publically funded multilateral 
governance to the new private actor partnerships in development. On another 
level it is the UNDP, in response to the external demands of states seeking 
accountability and results, that has shifted its internal policy toward practices 
deemed legitimate in the eyes of donor states and in line with similar 
strategies of the Bretton Woods Institutions. The proximity in timing of the 
launch of credit rating partnerships by the U.S. State Department and the 
UNDP with Standard & Poor’s coinciding with the Monterrey Conference on 
Financing for Development and the launch of the Millennium Challenge 
Account by US State Department 2002 (Mawdsley, 2007), is therefore no 
coincidence.  It highlights how broad and public consensus on such 
quantitative market strategies has become, strengthened by coalitions 
between states, IOs and private entities and in particular convergence in 
policy between the major development organisations of the World Bank and 
the UNDP. What separates development practices by the UNDP is the 
complicated evolution of capacity development in the UN (Fromerand, 
2003:17, resulting from the particular historical structure of development in 
the UN (Emmerij et al., 2005) and the uncertain nature of the UNDPs 
resources through voluntary contributions. 
 
 Capacity development is the central focus of the UNDP which seeks to 
empower people and institutions ‘to set and achieve their own development 
objectives’ (UNDP, 2008). It is based on the original operating procedure and 
early UN work of ‘technical assistance’ through the transfer of skills, 
resources and institutions from which the UNDP evolved. The ‘UNDP’s 
coordination work is [then] about building the capacity of government’s, the 
capacity to take on the task themselves either individually, within each 
country, or collectively, through the United Nations’ (Murphy, 2007:13). 
While the credit rating initiative certainly fits with previous examples of 
UNDP work in building the economic and financial capabilities of developing 
states like Singapore (Murphy, 2007:101-3), there is a notable difference in the 
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context and nature of the rating process as it was organised and carried out at 
a distance from the countries involved. The initiation of the ratings, through 
various recommendations of summits and donor states seen above, led to the 
sponsorship by the U.S. State Department and the UNDP of the initial ratings. 
The scheme which seeks to fulfil part of the MDGs goals on poverty is also 
heavily influenced by the poverty reduction strategies and debt relief agendas 
of the Bretton Woods Institutions (Murphy, 2007:310; S&Ps, 2006).  Whether 
credit rating is being suggested as transparency to promote better economic 
practices or a serious step toward accessing global capital markets to bridge 
the gap of development assistance (UNDP, 2007; S&Ps 2006; Kaul and 
Conceicao, 2006) it is problematic introducing financial methods which 
encourage debt financing to already heavily indebted countries with weak 
institutional capacities. If capacity development is to meant to build on 
nascent opportunities and encourage institutions existing in countries then 
the need for the UNDP to pay for ratings does not accord with sustainable, 
voluntary or technical assistance as part of capacity building which helps 
‘governments to identify what capacity exists in terms of skills, knowledge, 
institutions and relationships’ (UNDP, 2009). It instead changes the role of the 
UNDP delegating authority between states to one that mediates the authority 
of credit ratings and states, enrolling the latter into a specific type of 
governance by private actors. 
 
 
S&Ps: Sovereign Credit Rating Partnership 
 
The rise of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in sovereign credit rating in the 
world revolves around the central change in the world economy and shift to 
the disintermediation of finance following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system. In particular CRAs now perform a key function in the ‘international 
creditor economy’ by creating access to capital which circumvents the 
traditional role of banks in lending practices as well as conditioning or 
‘civilising’ the practices of states (Seabrooke, 2006). The particular CRA in this 
case, Standard and Poor’s (S&Ps), was contracted by the UNDP on behalf of 
developing states seeking to engage capital markets and investment. This 
engagement was the result of both the external and internal processes 
affecting the UNDP described above, but also based on a particular set of 
conditions seeking to encourage investment and transparency measures in 
combination with debt relief measures for developing states that relied on the 
particular strength capital market finance the central role of rating agencies, 
under the debt relief schemes of the World Bank and IMF. 
 
Rating agencies emerged from market surveillance mechanisms aimed at the 
assessment of creditworthiness. They form the basis of the way in which an 
entity whether firm, municipality or state can now borrow money by issuing 
bond securities. The process of determining the rating is complicated by the 
difference in size and ability of individuals, companies and states to manage 
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capital markets rather than loans through traditional banks. Referred to as the 
disintermediation of finance, where the traditional intermediary role of the 
bank which decided creditworthiness has been weakened, capital is sought 
instead through structuring debt on more opaque capital markets (Sinclair, 
2005; Seabrooke, 2006). With the internationalisation of companies and 
growth in complexity of financial systems which comprise these capital 
markets, ratings have developed new and more complicated ways also. This 
seen most clearly in the recent failure of the CRAs during the sub-prime crisis 
in determining creditworthiness of companies and even their complicity in 
designing newly structured complex financial packages based on derivatives, 
that have stretched their analytical capability based on dubious new ratings 
scales and responses (Sinclair, 2005:27; Lowenstein, 2008). The ratings 
addressed in this paper refer to solely to sovereign credit ratings applied to 
states, however the principle behind rating corporations or any entity is 
essentially the same.  
 
In practical terms S&Ps employ similar numbers of staff to the UNDP, around 
5,000 in over 20 countries, and based also in New York the company 
‘provides widely recognized financial data, analytical research and 
investment, and credit opinions to the global capital markets…an 
organisation that has been a world leader for more than a 140 years’ (S&Ps, 
2006).  S&Ps, Moody’s and the French based Fitch now form the three largest 
international CRAs which hold a virtual oligopoly over international 
corporate and sovereign rating. While the history and growth of credit rating 
agencies is well documented elsewhere (Sinclair, 2005), it is important to 
address the rating process here to understand why they are so influential.  
 
Essentially the rating process consists of gathering information, both 
qualitative and quantitative, on the economic and financial viability of actors 
wishing to issue debt to raise capital in markets. After information is 
compiled an analytical determination by experts issues a grade or rating 
which initiates a process of surveillance by investors who determine the value 
of the debt issued as bonds. Ratings are typically requested and paid for by 
the entity being rated otherwise or the ‘issuer’ of bonds, or in this case they 
are paid for by an outside institution such as the partnership with the 
intermediary of the UNDP. Information for ratings is gathered from many 
sources with cooperation from the issuer on confidential quantitative hard 
numbers concerning internal finance and economy as well as qualitative 
aspects of management structures, policies of the company or government 
involved. Ideally this is combined or corroborated with external information 
from other sources in the surrounding environment before the analytical 
determination (Sinclair, 2005:30). It is this final determination that decides the 
rating which is the most contentious and difficult part of the exercise. Sinclair 
describes the process whereby,  
 
…agencies assemble analytical teams that undertake research, meet with issuers, and prepare 
a report containing a rating recommendation and rationale. The teams present their view to a 
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rating committee of senior agency officials, which makes the final determination in 
private…the most secretive aspect of the rating business is the analytical process for 
producing bond rating judgements. (Sinclair, 2005: 33) 
 
 
The secrecy of methodological approaches between CRAs creates some 
discrepancy between final ratings but is explained both from the CRAs 
perspective and that of investors as maintaining some competitive edge for 
the former while providing a choice for the latter consumers of the 
information in making their decision (Mosely, 2003:137). The problem that 
arises in the output of the ratings is the objectification of knowledge that 
becomes authoritative due to volume and complexity of rating products sold 
by these companies (Sinclair, 2005: 35-40). Added to this is the continued 
surveillance requiring ongoing renewal of the ratings which disciplines states 
according to investors profit, rather than domestic demands, to ensure the 
ability to repay debt and raise capital in the future. On a governance level this 
is seen as transparency, a key goal for the UNDP/S&Ps initiative which seeks 
to build faith and stability in African markets based on a combination of the 
power of ratings, yet it also requires the development of expertise and 
resources of governments to manage a relationship which is heavily 
scrutinised and governed by a multiplicity of investors disconnected from the 
processes of government.  
 
 CRA authority can then be understood as power through ratings based on 
information which is used to generate capital by states for profit 
maximisation by investors. The ability of CRAs to conduct economic 
surveillance of firms and states through the ‘scientific’ process of rating 
endows them with a particular authority derived from knowledge and 
expertise that can constrain and empower states. This power is based on an 
idea of objectivity which appeals for transparency and increasing the trust 
investors and populations, that places CRAs in authority as part of governing 
structures that manage global finance. It is this appeal to transparency and the 
promise of investment that can strengthen the autonomous governing 
capacity of states by which the UNDP seeks to ensure the stability of their 
economic and social structures. Yet these same standards of transparency 
have not been applied to the CRAs and the subjective and secret nature by 
which they determine their ratings. There is then an obvious need to address 
not only how CRAs obtain political power but their own political role and 
authority that stems from the power of ratings. 
 
 
Rating and Partnership 
 
S&Ps rated 111 sovereigns in 2006 with an aim to add 25-50 over the next 
decade (Beers, 2006). The partnership between the UNDP and S&Ps that 
began in 2002 now extends to a total of 16 rated African countries with Kenya 
and the Seychelles added in 2007i along with Eastern European countries, 
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Macedonia and Georgia and the first Asian country being Sri Lanka in 2005. 
The important difference here to the credit ratings obtained by Latin 
American and Asian countries in the late 1990s is the sponsorship provided 
by the US Government and UNDP which brings into question the use of 
public funds to obtain private market authority (Hall and Bierstecker, 2002) 
and on behalf of developing states. 
 
The first reason cited for organising sovereign credit ratings for developing 
countries by the UNDP is goal number 8 of the MDGs targeting ‘the 
mobilization of resources to fight poverty’ (S&Ps, 2006). By helping countries 
integrate their economies into the mechanics of global finance markets this 
provides transparency and encourages confidence for investment all the way 
down the chain to the local level of business (S&Ps, 2006). A second answer is 
that by cooperating with CRAs in risk analysis the UNDP management is 
engaging new practices in line with market techniques (Power, 2007) that seek 
to compliment the IMF and World Bank’s International Development 
Association (IDA) debt relief programs by providing means to accessing 
capital to fill the gap between Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 
debt relief (S&Ps, 2006). Termed the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) 
the IMF and World Bank  in cooperation with the African Development Bank 
has sought to fund full debt relief under particular conditions for a specified 
group of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). As Abrahamson points 
out this initiative has grown into ‘partnerships’ between developing countries 
and donors, represented by the Bretton Woods Institutions, which returns 
‘power and influence to African states through ‘ownership’ whereby ‘policy 
reform and institutional development should not be imported or imposed, 
but must be homegrown’ (Abrahamson, 2004:1455). As we have seen with 
regard to the UNDPs notion of capacity development this is hardly a 
revolutionary idea yet in relation to the Bretton Woods Institutions ‘the claim 
to ownership and consultation are also challenged by the fact that the current 
poverty reduction strategy remains firmly within the neo-liberal economic 
policies of the structural adjustment period’ (Abrahamson, 2004:1457). It is 
perhaps as a result of this that there is a distinct reluctance by the UNDP and 
the surprisingly few staff aware of the rating initiative to go into detail about 
the nature of the scheme.  
 
The initiative appears to have been formulated primarily as a ‘one off’ foray 
in the early attempts by the UNDP to engage private actors. It was heavily 
influenced by the Bretton Woods Institutions and a report they commissioned 
from Price Waterhouse Coopers into emerging markets capacity (Interview, 
UNDP, 2009). The scheme was initiated and led by UNDP Associate 
Administrator Zephirin Diabre, former Minister of Economy, Finance and 
Planning in Burkina Faso, with around 230,000USD as seed money for entry 
ratings. It was an attempt to harness ‘ascendant capital markets’ and prove 
new ideas seeking to engage private actors in ‘operational partnerships’ that 
would ‘build donor trust’ with the UNDP (Interview,
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According to the UNDP, S&Ps ratings occur every 2-3 years. An initial rating 
costs around $80,000 USD with subsequent ratings around $40,000 USD 
(Interview, UNDP, 2007). Why then is the UNDP needed to pay such small 
amounts? At this cost ratings are affordable for even the poorest countries 
and indeed many were rated before the UNDP became involved in 2002. 
Therefore the problem does not lie with the intention or perception of what 
ratings hope to achieve but the changing nature of development policy which, 
increasingly quantitative, preferences partnerships with private authorities 
such as CRAs that produce ratings that are often controversial and selective in 
nature. It is noted within the UNDP by economists who have independently 
advised governments not to participate in the initiative (Interview UNDP 
Africa Bureaux, 2007), but seek alternate ratings by entities such as the 
African Development Bank with a greater understanding of local context and 
economies. 
 
The role of ratings must not be overstated here as the UNDP points out, 
‘credit ratings are part of a multi-faceted strategy of reducing poverty in 
Africa. The strategy aims to increase economic growth in given countries by 
encouraging significant investment resources, through a combination of 
overseas development aid, foreign direct investment (FDI) and most 
importantly, through private capital markets - both domestic and foreign’ 
(Africa Investor, 2004). 
 
What ratings then actually mean in material return and what their effects are 
on developing countries in the new global economy is also much harder to 
gauge than measuring or evaluating traditional Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The literature in the 
field that does attempt to understand the effects and results of ratings is 
primarily econometric and observes changes in investors reaction to markets 
and the spread of bonds (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Carlson and Hale, 2002) or 
explaining the effects of ratings on financial markets through country risk and 
stock returns (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). More analytical accounts 
suggest that ratings in ‘frontier economies’ (Mosley, 2003) such as Africa may 
improve attitudes and encourage some investors in dispelling traditional bias 
about unreliable service markets. Other suggest that ratings are unlikely to 
have much effect on primary resource oriented economies in which industry 
sectors produce their own risk assessment and in fact that heavily indebted 
countries won’t be able to issue bonds at non-concessional rates (Lehmann, 
2002). The assessment by S&Ps in their reports for ‘filling the funding gap’ are 
therefore hypothetical scenarios based on the particular debt level of 
countries under the MDRI. While the report is filled with caveats based on 
‘governance standards’ and the limits of non-concessional terms due to 
‘narrow revenue bases’ (S&Ps, 2006), yet there is one final aspect as to why 
credit rating is promoted as a viable strategy to already indebted countries. It 
originates in the more politically sensitive colonial history of some West 
African states, and in the case of some countries the scheme also aimed at 
13 
 
circumventing the entrenched institutional restrictions of the post-colonial 
banking sectors. Former French colonies in particular have struggled with 
financial liberalisation under institutions heavily controlled by Francophone 
banking systems and elites in government (Lavelle, 2001:727-9).  
 
The issue of credit rating as an internal organisational initiative and external 
mechanism presents an interesting case in the changing nature of legitimacy 
and authority in development and global governance, but actual private 
sector partnerships in total only constitute contributions of around $100 
million USD in UNDP programmes (UNDP, Interview 2009). While the 
UNDP initiative might boost prestige with donors and address the pressure 
of the MDG timeline, it is also one of increased governance responsibilities for 
an IO arranged around capacity development. Although not typically an 
economic organisation like the World Bank or IMF, the UNDP has 
increasingly adopted business and market strategies. How then do we 
understand rating as a governmental technology in terms of the UNDP and 
S&Ps and the rationality to which states and IOs adhere in their engagement 
of development and markets? Until recently this may have been framed in 
seemingly conventional neo-liberal terms of market efficiency and access to 
capital. 
 
 
Governmentality and the Power of Rating 
 
The empirical discussion above has sought to outline how a transformation of 
governance has taken place in the UNDPs approach to capacity development. 
The case emphasises a shift in the rationality of initiatives dealing with 
poverty toward external partnerships and an emphasis on quantitative 
approaches. The choice of governmentality for the analysis of this case is 
based on literature which seeks to uncover indirect forms of power that occur 
through changes in the rationality and modes of governance resulting from 
new and shifting relationships between state, IO and private actors. As Miller 
and Rose suggest ‘to the extent that the modern state ‘rules’, it does so on the 
basis of an elaborate network of relations formed amongst the complex of 
institutions, organizations and apparatuses that make it up, and between state 
and non-state institutions’ (Miller and Rose, 2008:55). Ascertaining where and 
to what extent power lies in governing requires investigation of the particular 
processes employed by these actors addressing issues of governance rather 
than a hierarchy of the actors themselves. Foucault’s understanding of the 
nature of governing as the ‘conduct of conduct’ primarily addresses the 
evolution of modern liberal practices of states in monitoring and shaping the 
behaviour of individuals and populations (Gordon, 1991:2-4). Or as Miller 
and Rose suggest ‘if the conduct of individuals or collectivities appeared to 
require conducting, this was because something in it appeared problematic to 
someone…to presume to govern seemed to require one to propose techniques 
to intervene…to become governmental, thought had to become technical’ 
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(Miller and Rose, 2008:14-15). In this case governmentality problematises 
rating and partnership as technologies of governance which are respectively 
also techniques of performance and agency.  
 
While rating is typically sought voluntarily by states its promotion by the 
UNDP becomes an act of conditioning that legitimates rating as a technology 
of governance which is more than a development technique empowering 
countries to engage the ‘global marketplace’. It is in the process of rating we 
see the empowerment of these numbers through ‘inscription’ or calculation 
based on the specific techniques of the rating agencies described above. It is 
the final rating which links states and their economies to private market based 
decisions and the social objectives of governments. As Abrahamson suggests, 
‘power in this understanding is not purely instrumentalist, but works through 
systems of knowledge and discursive practices to provide the meanings, 
norms, values and identities that not only constrain actors but also constitute 
them’ (Abrahamson, 2004:1459).  Thus understanding how ratings contain 
power to shape the behaviour of individuals and populations and IOs or 
states, is to understand the nature of power generated through consent rather 
than coercion (Sinclair, 2005:175-6). This consent is based on a trust in ratings 
compiled by CRAs to create numbers by which economies can be judged 
transparent and thus inspire confidence in investors. Here the performance of 
rating acts as a technology for restoring trust (Dean,1999:171). This is of 
particular significance to all states, let alone those with weak institutions, as 
the market encroaches upon sovereignty and governments control over their 
domestic economies become constrained by measures of performance and 
what is thought to be of interest to investors rather than good for the 
population.  
 
Governmentality highlights how numbers, as good or bad indicators, become 
technologies of performance that trigger the ‘conduct of conduct’ creating a 
position whereby states have to react to judgements on their ability to manage 
information and guide the economy. To understand how sovereign rating 
works as a technology of performance it must be understood as ‘an 
assemblage of forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, 
practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority [and] forms of 
judgement’ (Rose, 1999:52), that is not purely apolitical information without 
power. Therefore ratings and partnerships are ‘a form of advanced liberal 
power [which] work through incorporation and inclusion rather than 
domination and imposition’ and address issues of resources and outcomes 
and constitute developing countries as agents responsible for their own fate 
(Abrahamson, 2004:1464). Here partnership also needs to be separated from 
that of the delegated authority of donors and the Bretton Woods Institutions 
with recipient states to the private-public divide in the relationship between 
the UNDP and S&Ps.  
 
15 
 
Both the ratings and partnership act on the basis of voluntary cooperation and 
increasing the independence of recipient states and populations. In the 
context of sovereign rating for developing countries generating consent also 
relies on partnership with the UNDP which the contracts expertise in 
targeting ‘populations of high risk’ (Dean, 1999: 168). The partnership here is 
then also a technology of agency. Yet while the ‘rationality’ of such 
partnerships offer the freedom of making developing countries capable self-
determining agents this ‘freedom is inextricable from the imposition and 
exercise of constraint’ placing the onus of failure or success upon discipline 
and cooperation of recipient states as part of the ‘emerging structure of aid 
governmentality’ (Abrahamson, 2004:1464). Here we can see the underlying 
rationality behind ratings in the case of developing countries. They provide 
‘courage to capital’ (Powell, 2002) for frontier economies setting standards 
which encourage investment. Yet rating as a form of benchmarking is ‘not an 
innocent source of knowledge but an attempt to govern states’ constituting 
states as both manipulable market subjects as well as rational self-interested 
subjects (Fougner, 2008:321-2).  
 
 It is not the intention here to dismiss the UNDP or suggest that it is 
deliberately or unwittingly colluding with private authority (Cutler et al., 
1999) via CRAs in perpetuating distorted mechanisms of neo-liberal global 
economic governance to the detriment of developing countries.  Yet in 
partnering with S&Ps a distinct but subtle shift is made in the rationality or 
‘programming’ underpinning analyses of poverty and the methods or 
‘technologies’ used in addressing it. This affects traditional notions of capacity 
development and governance delegated by donor states through the UNDP. 
It alters the neutral and the voluntary element of expertise engaged on behalf 
of recipient states as ratings is inherently support the surveillance of actors 
within markets who do not share the social and development concerns of the 
UNDP. The nature of the UNDPs legitimacy and authority is based on a 
multiplicity of relations, and also the shift in demands on the UNDP for 
accountability and transparency attendant with a rise in demands for 
numbers and benchmarking to quantify efficiency and outcomes.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Credit rating, while seen as a practice which mitigates risk in finance and 
business through increasing information flows for investment, it is not an 
apolitical function of market interaction. The quantitative nature of sovereign 
of ratings does not bear out the complex qualitative political and social 
realities of the countries concerned. The political power that CRAs wield in 
governance of the global economy is increasingly being understood as a 
particular form of authority whose effects can constrain not only corporations 
but also municipal governments and ultimately states themselves despite also 
suggesting economic stability and prosperity. As Sinclair notes, ‘the rating 
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process provide a transmission pathway for the delivery of policy and 
managerial orthodoxy to widely scattered governments and corporations. In 
this sense, the agencies are nominally private makers of global public policy. 
They are agents of convergence, who seek to enforce “best practice” and 
“transparency” on the world.’ Further its is the role that CRAs play in the 
‘adjustment of the “operating system,” or mental schemata, [that] is the most 
consequential impact of the agencies’ work and the least considered 
elsewhere’ (Sinclair, 2005: 177).    
 
Thus while UNDP attempts to engage credit rating as a purely technical 
device building states capacities by providing access to expertise and 
resources for governments to equitably manage and improve the lives of 
populations, they also engage a particular form of authority and judgement 
separate to both states and public organisations. The nature and delegation of 
agency to IOs is often seen in rationalist terms of donor and recipient states 
working through the organisation. Some analysis shifts this agency to 
bureaucrats and the way the pressures on organisations cause them to pursue 
polices that contradict the mandate or state constituents of the IO. The 
analysis here incorporates both these levels of interaction in the UNDP but 
has sought to focus in particular on the partnership with S&Ps and the power 
of ratings as technologies of government. 
 
Here it is seen that CRA ratings are a particular form of rationality primarily 
quantitative, concerned with integrating countries into market economies 
rather than building traditional state capacities. This can be beneficial in terms 
of raising capital or at creating a particular form of transparency but is also 
reliant on stable markets and liquidity in the system which has been shown to 
be fragile. The use of ratings in terms of private actors in development are 
only one piece of the puzzle in encouraging entrepreneurship and the growth 
of domestic markets, but it must be recognised that above this purpose they 
are also a powerful political technology with particular consequences for 
those subject to their governance.  In partnership with S&Ps the UNDP 
legitimised and mediated this process as well as materially encouraged a 
particular faith in the pursuit credit. From this it can be seen how initiatives 
which seek to partner public institutions with private ones are changing the 
understanding of governance especially in development. In this case it is in 
particular the notion of capacity development which underpins the role of the 
UNDP in the governance of development which is in danger of being 
distorted by rating and the power of numbers. Through this market 
mechanism, or technology, particular private capacities may be enhanced 
which run counter to the UNDPs social goals of distributive justice. 
 
In taking on a central role coordinating the benchmarks of the MDGs the 
UNDP is also reliant externally on its ‘reputational’ role (Broome, 2008) which 
is seen as less constraining than that of the Bretton Woods Institutions in 
global governance. Internally strategies seeking new sources of material 
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support and partnership have seen the UNDP move more quantitative 
methods and policy. The internal and external shift in strategy by the UNDP  
is in part due to the decrease in state support for multilateral development 
and voluntary contributions resulting in an emphasis on market mechanisms 
in solving development problems, and an increased desire by donors for 
standards of efficiency and ‘value for money’. Global governance in the sense 
of multilateral development is typically analysed through hierarchical 
structures that use the delegated authority of states and public resources or 
seek to understand how ideas are shaped and influenced by bureaucrats 
within the organisation. These analyses are difficult in the case of the UNDP 
due to the lack of coherent and coercive power wielded by either states or 
bureaucrats through the dispersed nature of its funding and structure. They 
also do not address the power of rating as a technology of which enables 
government at distance or the constitution of partnerships that seek to use 
private authority to affect sustainable public goals. This case has addressed a 
new form of governance taking place through this dispersed authority linking 
states, IOs and private actors which seek to promote the economic 
development of poorer countries by integrating them into the global market 
through the credit rating process. 
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